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INDIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL
DISCOURSE: A COMMENT ON MEESE
ROBERT F. NAGEL*
Professor Meese begins his article by indicating three types of executive
branch responses to the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations: (1)
compliance, (2) forthright disagreement, and (3) covert or disguised
disagreement. He criticizes the Clinton Administration for using this third
approach on affirmative action or, as he states at the end of his article, for
"praising and gutting [the Bakke decision] at the same time."' This strategy, he
claims, prevents political dialogue on the wisdom of Bakke and, therefore, may
have the perverse effect of cementing the very approach to affirmative action
that the Administration disfavors.
Meese's criticism presupposes a certain type of dialogue, the kind of
intellectualized dialogue where terms are clarified and justifications are
assessed and refined. He has in mind a discourse explicitly reassessing Justice
Powell's conclusion that achieving academic diversity is a "compelling" state
interest while overcoming social discrimination is not. Forthright disagreement
with Bakke by the Clinton Justice Department, under this view, might have
induced further judicial reflection on questions like these: What is "diversity"?
Why is it important? Why is it more important than the objective of rectifying
historical racial injustice or achieving greater future racial equality?
Because Meese defines "dialogue" as intellectualized discourse on such
questions, it is clear why he assumes that neither compliance nor disguised
disagreement will produce it. Compliance implies agreement, so it places
nothing in question. Disguised disagreement directs attention to the propriety
of the Clinton Administration's interpretations of Bakke rather than to the
merits of Bakke itself, so it places the wrong issue in question.
It is true that intellectualized dialogue requires the forthright exchange of
arguments. Less obvious, at least to those fortunate enough to be able to take
such dialogue for granted, is that a number of other conditions are necessary as
well. Intellectualized dialogue also requires, for example, a common
vocabulary, capable speakers, and some agreement about purpose and
procedure. Most pertinent to Meese's analysis, intellectualized discourse
requires that the participants be willing to listen to one another, for otherwise
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1. ALAN J. MEESE, Bakke Betrayed, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479, 504 (WINTER/SPRING
2000) (referring to Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
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there are words in the air but no real dialogue. To have their words listened to,
in turn, requires that the various speakers must be viewed by the other
participants as sufficiently entitled to speak that they should be heard.
Professor Meese alludes to the growing signs-in Cooper v. Aaron,2 in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,3 and, I would add, in City of Boerne v. Flores'-
that at least some members of the Court do not believe that any branch of
government is entitled to speak in a way that conflicts with a judicial
interpretation! He deals with this consideration by noting that a part of the
American political tradition is for the executive branch, in one degree or
another, to form and act on its own interpretations of the Constitution.6 This
assertion is no doubt accurate but is of questionable relevance. Whether the
members of the Court or the public at large view executive branch
disagreement as legitimate is an empirical, not a normative, matter. That highly
respected presidents have long believed in the legitimacy of their constitutional
disagreements with the Court does not establish what the current members of
the Court think on that issue.
Assuming the Justices are just self-important enough to think their
interpretations should be final and that executive branch disagreements are
cheeky, insubordinate, and a deep threat to our constitutional form of
government,7 then the Justices might not be inclined to listen to executive
branch dialogue and might even be less inclined to reconsider their own
interpretations than if the executive branch had never challenged them.' To the
extent this is true, disagreement, while forthright, will not produce dialogue.
Intellectualized dialogue may not be practicable when dealing with highly
sensitive issues, but other kinds of dialogue may still be feasible. Joking or
raising an issue implicitly and discreetly may be possible. Raising an issue while
pretending not to raise it at all is another alternative. Such techniques involve a
certain amount of indirection and even hypocrisy, but they are an everyday part
of ordinary human dialogue. These common techniques do not necessarily do
much to clarify terms or assess justifications; they may in fact obscure issues.
As imperfect as they are, however, these ordinary conversational techniques
can sometimes induce an unwilling party to reconsider a difficult issue. The
2. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
3. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5. See Meese, supra note 1, at 479. On Flores, see generally Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy
and the Settlement Function, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 849 (1998).
6. See Meese, supra note 1 at 480.
7. The strongest such language is found in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
The most relevant language for inter-branch dialogue at the federal level is in City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997):
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the
government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the
other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the
province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.
Id. at 535-36.
8. See Nagel, supra note 5, at 860-62.
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Clinton Justice Department's treatment of Bakke can be viewed as an effort at
just such nonacademic, everyday dialogue. If its praise of Bakke is loud while
its interpretations are, as Meese argues, tendentious, the Department's method
is not far different from, for example, the academic who softens his criticism of
a colleague's manuscript by firmly praising it while subtly suggesting that the
colleague probably meant something quite different from what the manuscript
actually says.
Such shady practices are not an ideal form of dialogue. While the
mislabeling and indirection that are a part of non-intellectualized dialogue can
help get an unwelcome message across, they can also cause people to
misunderstand their own experiences and motivations. Some strong
proponents of affirmative action, having towed the Bakke line for so long, have
probably half forgotten that their support for racial preferences is primarily
based on a deep desire to correct the nation's generalized history of racial
injustice. Nevertheless, when big egos and sensitive issues are involved, such
methods sometimes represent the only form of realistic interchange. Certainly,
these practices can result in some useful communication of ideas and
information. Feigned or superficial compliance with Bakke, for example, has
tended to delay the successful imposition of a uniform national rule against
racial quotas in higher education. This delay has implicitly communicated
disagreement with aspects of Bakke and, more importantly, has provided very
useful experiential information concerning the benefits and harms of those
quotas.
Despite their benefits, because ordinary, non-intellectualized forms of
dialogue utilize vagueness, indirection, confusion, and even hypocrisy, they may
seem to be an exceedingly inappropriate way to influence the legal system. But
consider this: Many of the Court's interpretations come with a built-in
invitation for such dialogue.
For example, the Court's school desegregation cases have said repeatedly
and clearly that defendants are under a constitutional obligation to remedy only
the segregation they have caused." Having so firmly taken this position, the
Court has naturally not been receptive to arguments to the effect that all de
facto segregation is unconstitutional or that the scope of the remedies for de
jure segregation should be independent of the scope of segregative acts. But
the Court allowed litigants and lower court judges indirectly to push both of
those positions by authorizing trial judges to use various evidentiary
presumptions to confound segregative acts with subsequent acts that failed to
achieve racial balance, and to employ what can only be described as fanciful
notions of social causality.1 The willingness of many lower court judges to seize
9. For a vivid illustration of a position on affirmative action changed by experience with the
program, see Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1998, at 20.
10. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189
(1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mechklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
11. For striking examples, see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Keyes, 413 U.S. 189.
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on these options no doubt sent to the Court a deeper argument about the
nature of segregation and the remedial role of modern courts.
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 the Court discussed angrily and
at length the illegitimacy of efforts to induce a reversal of Roe v. Wade13 -or, as
the Court put it, "break faith"-and insisted that the right created in Roe was
secure. But then, somewhat more quietly, the same Court jettisoned Roe's
trimester scheme and thus in reality created a significantly reduced
constitutional right." Other branches and levels of government were thereby
invited to "talk back" to the Court as long as they used the ostensibly practical
vocabulary of "undue burdens." In this way, the Court effectively invited
indirect challenges to the moral calculus adopted in Roe. This invitation has
since been accepted by those states that have enacted bans on "partial birth
abortions." If the Court eventually determines that these prohibitions do not
impose an undue burden on the right to abortion, it will have significantly-if
not explicitly-departed from its earlier assessment of the states' interests in
limiting abortion.'5
Bakke,"6 as well as Adarand'7 and Croson,"' send similar invitations for
indirect dialogue. These cases clearly establish that affirmative action programs
have to be specially justified and carefully tailored. But such programs continue
to be the norm throughout the academic world, the federal government, and
elsewhere. They are still the rule, not the exception. One reason for this
inversion of the basic thrust of the Court's emphatic and elaborate
constitutional interpretations is that those interpretations themselves also call
for potentially endless study and redesign."' That is, the Court's own opinions
suggest delay and permit evasion. Those, like members of the Clinton Justice
Department, who disagree with the Court's grand pronouncements are free to
12. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
15. For example, discussing one state's objectives in prohibiting partial birth abortions, Judge
Posner writes:
On the merits, the most important issue ... is that of undue burden.... To understand this
issue requires understanding the peculiar and questionable character of these statutes. They
do not protect the lives of fetuses either directly or by seeking to persuade a woman to
reconsider her decision to seek an abortion. For the statutes do not forbid the destruction of
any class of fetuses, but merely criminalize a method of abortion-they thus have less to
recommend them than the antiabortion statutes invalidated in Roe v. Wade....
The uninformed [that is, supporters of the statute] thought the D & X procedure gratuitously
cruel, akin to infanticide; they didn't realize that the only difference between it and the
methods of late term abortion that are conceded all round to be constitutionally privileged is
which way the fetus's feet are pointing.
The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 878-80 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting).
16. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
17. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
18. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
19. For the Clinton Administration's recognition of this invitation, see Office of Legal Counsel,
Memorandum to General Counsels, Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court's
Decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1995 WL 835775 (O.L.C.) (June 28, 1995).
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re-argue these large matters of principle, but only indirectly. As empirical
studies are amassed, unconvincingly and stubbornly finding specific histories of
racial discrimination,0 one implicit message will be that many officials believe
that the Court was wrong to distinguish between the state's interest in
correcting illegal discrimination and its interest in correcting a diffuse history of
racial injustice.
In sum, Professor Meese is right that the Clinton Administration's strategy
does not produce the best possible form of constitutional dialogue. However, it
does produce another recognizable form of dialogue, one full of confusion and
hypocrisy but a surprisingly central and entrenched part of the practice of
judicial review itself. Indeed, the irony is that the more the Justices view their
highly intellectualized interpretations of the Constitution as supremely
authoritative, the more they are likely to encourage these relatively non-
intellectualized forms of dialogue.
20. See George R. LaNoue, Social Science and Minority "Set-Asides." PUB. INT.. Winter 1993, at

